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INTRODUCTION
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of the Cold War' and
the beginning of a new era of international cooperation not previously seen
in modem history. The U.N. Security Council, healed of the 45-year paraly-
sis brought on by East-West confrontations, began to exercise powers with
the authority and credibility originally envisioned for it, but never before re-
alized.2 The hope for a new, more peaceful millennium was further encour-
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1. "The Cold War was also an international system. It lasted roughly from 1945 to 1989,
when, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was replaced by another system: the new era of glob-
alization we are now in." THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE xvii (2000).
In November 1989, East Germany was at the point of bankruptcy, and, in the hopes of receiv-
ing a large loan from the West Germans, East Germany decided to allow its citizens to travel
abroad upon request. NORMAN FRIEDMAN, THE FtFrY-YEAK WAR 479 (2000).
The opportunity to go West was too good to miss. Large crowds began to move to
the Berlin Wall. To avoid riots, the East Germans simply opened their borders.
Soon the opening was made permanent: the wall was torn down. The East Ger-
mans had thrown their state away, although probably they did not yet realize that.
... To the extent that the Cold War had been fought over Germany, Gorbachev
had lost.
Id. (citation omitted).
2. See DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LopEz, THE SANCTIONS DECADE 1 (2000) ("The
end of the Cold War brought with it a new willingness among the once contentious super-
powers to use the Chapter VII instruments vested in the United Nations (U.N.) Security
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aged by implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, which created
the World Trade Organization in 1995.1 By the beginning of the new millen-
nium, political and social scientists were arguing that wars would become
obsolete as economic and political integration continued to grow among the
nations of the world.4
Then came September 1 lth, and along with it came a sea of change in
geopolitical strategies and responses.5 In his 2002 State of the Union Ad-
Council as the peace and security mechanisms originally envisioned in the U.N. Charter.")
(citation omitted); Tetsuo Sato, The Legitimacy of Security Council Activities Under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter Since the End of the Cold War, in THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 309 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001)
("[T]he practice of the Security Council, particularly the enforcement activities based upon
the powers enjoyed by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, have
changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War.") (citation omitted); Michael J. Jordan,
Who's In, Who's Out: U.N. Security Council Mulls Reform, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Oct.
16, 2002, at 7.
3. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143-44 (1995).
4. This was certainly not a new idea. The purpose of the Bretton Woods Conference,
which created the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and from which emerged the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Christiana Ochoa, Advancing the Lan-
guage of Human Rights in a Global Economic Order, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 57, 63
(2003), was to integrate the world economies and lead to a more lasting peace following
World War II. See PATRICK A. MCCARTHY, HIERARCHY AND FLEXIBILITY IN WORLD POLITICS
164-67 (1998). "A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing pros-
perity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free
markets creates new jobs and higher incomes.... [I]t reinforces the habits of liberty." WHITE
HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (2002),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15538.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY]. At least one Congressman has argued that stability and democracy have spread
throughout Latin America because of liberalization of trade and integration of economies:
"We can't take this for granted. We cannot assume it will always be this way. The trend to-
wards open markets and democratic rule may not continue.... [E]conomic stagnation breeds
political instability, and instability breeds mass emigration, civil unrest, military conflict, and
poverty." Jim Kolbe, The NAFTA and the Expansion of Free Trade: Current Issues and Fu-
ture Prospects "A View from Capitol Hill," 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 291, 293 (1997).
President Clinton's U.S. Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky made a similar argument
in 1999 while defending pursuit of the Free Trade Area of the Americas: "Trade integration
has both benefited from and strengthened peace, freedom, democracy and the rule of law
throughout the hemisphere. And the Free Trade Area of the Americas will improve,
strengthen, and transcend all of this." Charlene Barshefsky, Keynote Address, 30 L. & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 1, 5 (1999). New York Times foreign affairs columnist, Thomas L. Friedman, in
his book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, recognized the power of economic integration to
bring about peace, but also recognized the influence of power:
The fact that no two major countries have gone to war since they both got McDon-
ald's is partly due to economic integration, but it is also due to the presence of
American power and America's willingness to use that power against those who
would threaten the system of globalization-from Iraq to North Korea. The hidden
hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist.
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 443.
5. Evan Thomas et al., The 12 Year Itch, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 2003, at 54.
In his first few months in office, Bush was much more worried about the com-
ing threat from China than he was about Iraq. He had no desire to be an interven-
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dress, George W. Bush outlined a new and forceful international role for the
United States in policing the world and providing for the country's national
security.6 President Bush made it clear that the United States would act uni-
laterally, if necessary, to protect our national interests.7 The vast majority of
tionist president, to play GloboCop. His foreign-policy pronouncements during the
2000 campaign had stressed the need for humility by the world's only superpower.
Then came 9-11. Almost instantly, everything changed. Bush seemed stag-
gered, but only for a moment. By the time he climbed onto the rubble at the World
Trade Center on the afternoon of Sept. 14 to vow revenge, he had dedicated his
presidency-and apparently his whole being-to making sure such an attack never
happened again. Without much consultation or debate, Bush formulated his own
"doctrine," holding that the United States would go after not only terrorists but
countries that harbored them as well.
Id.
Vice President Dick Cheney said the Sept. I 1 attacks had changed all of the rules
of how the U.S. would defend itself. "If we simply sit back and operate by 20th-
century standards .... we say wait until we're hit by an identifiable attack from
Iraq," he said. "The consequences could be devastating."
Carla Anne Robbins, Endgame: Ceasing Diplomacy, U.S. Nears War, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
2003, at Al. Political commentator and former presidential candidate, Patrick Buchanan, saw
September 11 th as confirming his belief in isolationism:
The New World Order of George H.W. Bush's vision, where the United States
would work through the United Nations to police the world, as free trade spread
and democratization deepened, can now never be realized by his son. The Clinton
vision, where America would nurture the institutions of World Government that
would grow in power to constrain the sovereignty of nations to create world peace,
is also dead.
Patrick J. Buchanan, A Time for Unity, WORLD NET DAILY (Mar. 19, 2003), at http://www.
worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLEID=31598.
6. President Bush warned the country that:
States like these [North Korea, Iran and Iraq), and their terrorist allies, constitute
an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could pro-
vide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They
could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these
cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html [hereinafter State of the Union Address
20021. "We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our
allies from sudden attack.... And all nations should know: America will do what is neces-
sary to ensure our nation's security." Id.
7. Bush's National Security Strategy stated:
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the interna-
tional community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our
right of self-defense by acting preemptively against... terrorists, to prevent them
from doing harm against our people and our country.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 6. President Bush promised to take action:
We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while
dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United
States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten
us with the world's most destructive weapons.
State of the Union Address 2002, supra note 6. The President expressed a similar sentiment a
year later during his 2003 State of the Union speech: "In all these efforts, however, America's
purpose is more than to follow a process-it is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to
the civilized world." President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003),
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states supported our war against Al Qaeda and their host government in Af-
ghanistan, the Taliban.8 However, that support quickly evaporated when we
turned our sights on Baghdad and Saddam Hussein.9 The United States and
Great Britain, believing Hussein to be in possession of weapons of mass de-
struction and attributing that fact to the limited progress that had been made
since the previous Gulf War with regard to enforcement of U.N. resolutions,
felt justified in taking preemptive action in this post-9/11 era to protect the
world from the possible use of these terrible weapons.' ° None of the other
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/2003012819.html. "The world has waited
12 years for Iraq to disarm. America will not accept a serious and mounting threat to our
country, and our friends and our allies." Id.
[O]n June 1, 2002, in an address at West Point, Bush elaborated on themes he had
in the past applied primarily to Iraq, spelling out what would henceforth be known
as the Bush Doctrine. First, he said that the United States would no longer rely
solely on "Cold-War doctrines of containment and deterrence." Instead, it would
reserve the right to preempt threats, to "take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his
plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge."
LAWRENCE F. KAPLAN & WILLIAM KRISTOL, THE WAR OVER IRAQ 73-74 (2003).
8. "[Tlhe U.S. drew international sympathy" after the September 1lth terrorist attacks.
War Draws Ire, Support from Unlikely Places, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2003, at A12. For ex-
ample, Russia and China were two countries that provided "strong backing for the U.S.-led
war on terrorism." Id. "Indonesian President Megawati Sukanoputri... [also] backed the
Bush administration's war in Afghanistan in 2001." Id. Pakistan was yet another supporter of
the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Peter Kammerer, Nuclear Deterrent Deal Fueled by Oil, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 2003, at 9. Additionally, "New Zealand and Australia....
both ... sent [Special Air Service] units to support the US-led war against the Taleban [sic]
and al Qaeda in Afghanistan." Robert Patman, Anzac: An Unequal Alliance, DOMINION POST,
Sept. 12, 2003, at 7. Yet another country, "Algeria[,] ... is an example of a country that sup-
ports the war on terrorism." Steven Komarow, U.S. General Says Europe Is Major Terror
Battlefield, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2002, at 4A. Finally, "Germany is one of the United States's
strongest supporters in the battle against terrorism." Elizabeth Becker et al., A Nation Chal-
lenged: Hearts and Minds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at IA.
9. As two journalists for the Wall Street Journal reported:
The war's "legitimacy will be questioned," warned U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan; New Zealand's prime minister called the U.S. legal position "highly
debatable." And German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer told the Security Coun-
cil ... that, "Under the current circumstances, there is no basis in the U.N. charter
for a regime change with military means."
Robert S. Greenberger & Jess Bravin, The Assault on Iraq: War May Conform with Law, but
U.S. Prestige May Suffer, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2003, at A13. On March 18, 2003, French
President Jacques Chirac issued a statement proclaiming that international law must be re-
spected and declaring that any U.S. decision to invade Iraq "compromises peaceful methods
for resolving crises in the future linked to the proliferation of arms of mass destruction."
Kevin J. Delaney, France's Chirac Blasts Move to War, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2003, at A12.
"In Canada, Prime Minister Jean Chretien told Parliament, to storms of applause, that his
country's troops wouldn't join in the U.S.-led war. The U.S. had been hoping Ottawa would
send special forces." Robbins, supra note 5. "Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite per-
sonal appeals from Mr. Bush, denounced plans for an attack in unusually strong terms, saying
a war 'would be fraught with the gravest of consequences. It will result in casualties and de-
stabilize the international situation in general."' Id.
10. Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 62.
The public outline [for war in Iraq] can be fairly clearly discerned by Bush's
speeches, first his State of the Union when he identified the Axis of Evil to include
4
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permanent members of the Security Council would see eye to eye with this
emerging doctrine of preemption and unilateralism against Iraq." Despite
twelve years of trying to rein in Saddam Hussein, Security Council members
opposed to the use of force against Iraq suggested that the U.N. resolution
and enforcement regime would ultimately succeed in taming Iraq, but that
more time was needed. 2 They argued that military action would be unjusti-
fied and premature. 3 Not surprisingly, news reports revealed that countries
opposed to the use of force against Iraq, namely France, Germany, and Rus-
sia, were also troubled by the idea of allowing the world's last remaining su-
perpower too much freedom in determining how to respond to perceived
threats to world peace.' 4 This new state of world affairs would bring us into
conflict with our allies, 5 draw us into another war in the Middle East, and
Iraq, Iran and North Korea-rogue regimes with WMD [Weapons of Mass De-
struction]-then at West Point in May, when he announced that the United States
would pre-empt threats from such regimes.
Id.
11. War Draws Ire, Support from Unlikely Places, supra note 8.
One of the strongest rebukes to the U.S. military campaign came from Russian
President Vladimir Putin, who appeared on television to demand a quick end to the
U.S. attack. "Military actions are taking place contrary to the world public opinion,
contrary to the principles and norms of international law and the charter of the
U.N."
China, too, surprised analysts with its harsh criticism of the U.S., indicating it
would try to rally other nations to stop the war. "The military operation against
Iraq is a violation of the United Nations' charter and the basic norms of interna-
tional law," a foreign ministry spokesman said.
Id. "French President Jacques Chirac, who led the antiwar camp in the U.N., issued a some-
what tepid condemnation of the military strikes yesterday, saying France 'regrets this action.'
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder called the U.S.-led attacks 'a bad decision,' but added
that German-American relations were not in danger." Id.
12. Some also suggested that opposing Security Council members (particularly France
and Russia) had a personal interest in delaying any kind of military action against Iraq be-
cause of lucrative business contacts. Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 60. "By the time George
W. Bush became president in January 2001, Saddam Hussein had every reason to believe he
was winning his long war against the United States. At the United Nations, the French and
Russians, eager for oil contracts, were pushing to do away with sanctions altogether." Id. "[I]n
2000, Baghdad's newly reopened Saddam International Airport began disgorging a steady
stream of politicians and businessmen on unauthorized flights from Russia, France and the
Arab world. All were there to do business with the outlaw regime." KAPLAN & KRISTOL, su-
pra note 7, at 54.
13. French President Jacques Chirac stated: "The United States has just issued an ultima-
tum to Iraq. Whether, I repeat, it's a matter of the necessary disarmament of Iraq or of the de-
sirable change of regime in that country, there is no justification for a unilateral decision to
resort to war." Threats and Responses; Chirac's View: 'A Heavy Responsibility,' N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2003, at A14 (text of statement made by French President Jacques Chirac as trans-
lated and issued by Elysee Palace).
14. "[A] key element of the criticism is global unease with U.S. might-particularly
when its military is unleashed." War Draws Ire, Support from Unlikely Places, supra note 8.
15. Relations with France were particularly strained as a result of the war in Iraq:
Complicating any rapprochement with the United States is Mr. Chirac's clinging
to his vision of a "multipolar" world in which the United States does not dominate.
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manage to weaken the newfound powers that the Security Council was just
beginning to exercise.' 6
The post-9/11 world provided the perfect soil for proposing invocation
of the little used customary international law doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense for dealing with our foes throughout the world. 7 Fear of future at-
"We can no longer accept the simple law of the strongest," he said in a prepared
statement during a visit to Malaysia last week.
The official Elysee Palace interpreter gave Mr. Chirac's words an even more
ominous meaning in English, saying, "We can no longer agree to have the law of
the strongest, the law of the jungle," although Mr. Chirac did not use that actual
phrase.
What he did say was powerful enough. "What we need is an international struc-
ture, an international mechanism to eliminate unilateralism and bring about multi-
lateralism," he said. The goal, he added, is "that nobody feels sidelined, marginal-
ized, humiliated."
Elaine Sciolino, France and Germany Consider Possible Roles in Postwar Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2003, at A10.
Criticism of the U.S. war in Iraq was stiff among Islamic countries in Southeast
Asia. Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who backed the Bush admini-
stration's war in Afghanistan in 2001, said the war contravened international law.
Acting Malaysian Premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said the U.S. "lacked evi-
dence to back" the attacks on Baghdad.
War Draws Ire, Support from Unlikely Places, supra note 8. "As Vice President Cheney out-
lined on NBC's 'Meet the Press' Sunday, we're moving to a world of shifting coalitions. The
strategies and institutions that kept the peace during the Cold War against a single great
power threat are unsuited to this century's threats from terror and proliferating weapons." Au
Revoir, Security Council, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2003, at A14.
16. "President Jacques Chirac of France... called the divisions over the war [with Iraq]
one of the gravest threats to multilateral institutions like the United Nations in modern times."
Steven R. Weisman, The Struggle for Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 2003, at Al. "Having failed
to block the U.S. from deposing Saddam Hussein, Kofi Annan now says 'the effort to relieve
the suffering of the Iraqi people may yet prove to be the task around which the unity of this
Council can be rebuilt."' Au Revoir, Security Council, supra note 15.
The dysfunction starts with the Security Council and the veto. The process gives
outsized influence to a country like France, which hasn't been a great power for 60
years and has as its main modern goal containing American power. One solution
would be to replace France on the Security Council with a more deserving nation
such as Japan or India, but that's nearly impossible under the U.N. charter.
Id. "Indiana Democrat Evan Bayh told Fox News this week that, 'In terms of the United Na-
tions being a legitimate vehicle for restraining tyrants with weapons of mass destruction, for
restraining aggressors, I think they have done themselves grievous damage."' Id.
Mr. Bush's decision to go it nearly alone-and France and Germany's decision to
allow that to happen-are threatening to relegate both the United Nations and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to permanent weakness, if not complete irrele-
vance. The long-held strategy of containing enemies is now being replaced with
one of pre-empting foes even before they have marshaled their forces to strike the
U.S.
Robbins, supra note 5.
17. Scholars and commentators may also refer to the doctrine as a "preemptive use of
force" or a "preventive use of force." See Gerald Powers, Ethical Analysis of War Against
Iraq, in WOULD AN INVASION OF IRAQ BE A JUST WAR?, 2003 U.S. INST. PEACE SPECIAL REP.
98, at http://www.usip.orglpubslspecialreportslsr98.html. "While strong positions have been
taken by nearly all States against 'preventive' or 'preemptive' war, some uncertainty remains
as to threats of force that credibly appear as likely to result in imminent attack." OSCAR
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tacks on the U.S. mainland, like those conducted on September 11th, gave
this doctrine a renewed preeminence.
Preemption is not a new idea. As an international law doctrine, it has
been around at least since the mid-19th century,'8 but its use against Iraq in
particular emerged during the Reagan administration and had been floated
for consideration in both the George H.W. Bush and the Clinton administra-
tions.' 9 The Bush Doctrine, as it was dubbed after being embraced by the
second Bush administration,2' reflected a move away from the doctrine of
containment that had characterized the Cold War era and opened a Pandora-
like box that could permit proactive uses of force never before seen in the
post-World War H era of international law.
Part I of this article provides an overview of international law on the use
of force prior to September 1 lth, with a focus on the application of interna-
tional conventions and international custom to the doctrine of anticipatory
self-defense. Part II examines the legal basis of the United States' arguments
for pursuit of a war against Iraq, and the failure to achieve international co-
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 141 (1991) [hereinafter
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW]. In addition, Security Council debates as late as 1981, in-
ferred "the continued validity of an 'inherent' right to use armed force in self-defense prior to
an actual attack but only where such an attack is imminent 'leaving no moment for delibera-
tion."' Oscar Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1635 (1984) [hereinafter Schachter, The Right of States].
18. Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 17, at 1634-35.
The conditions of the right of anticipatory defense under customary law were
expressed generally in an eloquent formulation by the U.S. Secretary of State
Daniel Webster in a diplomatic note to the British in 1842.... [He stated) that
self-defense must be confined to cases in which "the necessity of that self-defence
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for de-
liberation."
Id. The occasion for the exchange of diplomatic notes arose as the result of a British attack of
a small steamer, the Caroline, which had been used in support of a Canadian insurrection, but
was sitting in U.S. territory at the time it was destroyed. 1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (2d ed. 1945); 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-10 (1906). See also R.B. MOWAT, THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 108 (1925); JESSE S. REEVES, PH. D., AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 17-18 (Peter Smith 1967) (1907).
19. See KAPLAN & KRISTOL, supra note 7, at 79-89; Michael Kirk, The War Behind
Closed Doors, PBS FRONTLINE, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/
(Feb. 20, 2003).
We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward
Iraq is not succeeding .... We urge you.., to enunciate a new strategy that would
secure the interests of the U.S .... That strategy should aim, above all, at the re-
moval of Saddam Hussein's regime from power.
Letter from various foreign policy experts, including Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz,
to President Bill Clinton (Jan. 26, 1998), http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclinton let-
ter.htm.
20. "Without much consultation or debate, Bush formulated his own 'doctrine,' holding
that the United States would go after not only terrorists but countries that harbored them as
well." Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 61-62. "[O]n June 1, 2002, in an address at West Point,
Bush elaborated on themes he had in the past applied primarily to Iraq, spelling out what
would henceforth be known as the Bush Doctrine." KAPLAN & KRISTOL, supra note 7, at 73.
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operation through the U.N. Security Council. This article concludes with a
discussion of the implications for international law and international diplo-
macy.
I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The development of international law as we know it today can be traced
to the fall of the Holy Roman Empire and is generally dated to the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648.21 As the Holy Roman Empire crumbled, independent
states, with their own political bases of power, began to emerge.22 No longer
subservient to the Emperor or the Pope, nation-states began to exercise indi-
vidual sovereign authority. 23 This newfound power of independence inevita-
bly led to conflict with other nascent states.24 Without an Emperor or Pope as
final arbiter, the newly emerging nation states were forced to look elsewhere
for conflict resolution.25 International law emerged to fill this vacuum with
its own set of rules to govern the relations between these developing states
and rules by which to settle disputes.26
The original sources of international law consisted of treaties (interna-
tional conventions) made between and among the emerging states and cus-
tomary practices (international custom) that developed outside of the treaty
regime.27 Treaty law, like contract law in our domestic societies, regulates
relations by virtue of agreement between or among the states party to the
treaty.28 The consent of each party tends to give treaty law a high degree of
legitimacy and, correspondingly, a high degree of compliance. 29 Unlike
2 1. Tim HILLIER, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW I (2d ed. 1999).
22. Id.
23. See generally STEPHEN J. LEE, ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 1494-1789 92-100
(2d ed. 1984) (describing the political struggles and disintegrating power of the Holy Roman
Empire between 1493 and 1618).
24. Id. at 115.
The Empire had now lost all the characteristics of a sovereign state and was never
again to come to a united political decision or to wage war as a unit.... In the fu-
ture it was time and time again to be the scene of warfare between member
states... as well as between external powers.
Id. "[Wlar made it possible for new, proud, revolutionary regimes to project worldwide a
moral message which would serve as an alternative to the corrupt ways of the old established
states." TORBioRN L. KNUTSEN, THE RISE AND FALL OF WORLD ORDERS 22 (1999). See also
Ambassador Bernhard Zepter, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission in Japan,
Speech at the Asia-Europe Forum 4th Symposium, Tokyo International Forum, How Are Re-
gions Formed: Comparing Asia with Europe (Feb. 22, 2003), at http://jpn.cec.eu.int/english/
press-info/4-2-116.htm.
25. See HILLIER, supra note 21, at 1.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 17.
29. "Legitimacy" has been defined by Professor Thomas Franck as "a property of a rule
or rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed
normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being
8
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treaty law, customary international law does not derive its legitimacy from
explicit agreements, but from acquiescence (implicit agreement) to the gen-
eral practice of states and a belief that such practice has acquired the norma-
tive characteristics of law.30 The seminal case identifying custom as a source
of international law in the United States was the U.S. Supreme Court's
Paquete Habana decision:31
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence for these, to the works of jurists and commenta-
tors who by years of labor, research, and experience have made them-
selves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Ju-
dicial tribunals resort to such works, not for the speculations of their
authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence
of what the law really is. 32
Other sources of international law have emerged over the past four cen-
turies,33 but international conventions and international custom are the two
that speak most directly to the state of international law on anticipatory self-
defense.
A. International Conventions: The United Nations Charter-Outlawing
Aggression as a Prescription for Peace
Any discussion regarding the use of force in self-defense, whether in an-
ticipation of attack or in response to an attack already undertaken, must be-
gin with the United Nations Charter. Written after WWII with the hope of
preventing future wars, the Charter sought to outlaw aggression and encour-
and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process." THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990).
30. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
31. Id. at 677.
32. Id. at 700.
33. Contemporary discussion of sources of international law centers around Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which identifies the following as sources of
international law:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055. The Re-
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States section 102 contains a
very similar list of sources. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1986). For a more complete discussion of the doctrine of sources, see
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 35-37.
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age the peaceful resolution of international disputes.34 Article 1(1) outlines
the principal purpose of the United Nations Organization:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.35
Formation of the United Nations organization was not the first attempt
by the world community to outlaw the use of force by sovereign states, but
was an evolution of international law that began after the First World War.36
Before WWI, use of force in general and the waging of war in particular was
seen as "a natural function of the State and a prerogative of its uncontrolled
sovereignty. 37 As such, international law permitted a state to wage war for
any reason it desired regardless of the underlying merits or justness of the
act. Lassa Oppenheim's influential treatise, International Law, cites to re-
spected international law author and scholar Charles Cheney Hyde in mak-
ing this point:
As Hyde, writing in 1922, said: "It always lies within the power of a
State... to gain political or other advantages over another, not merely by
the employment of force, but also by direct recourse to war." International
Law did not consider as illegal a war admittedly waged for such pur-
poses.
38
The terrible devastation and suffering wrought by World War I encour-
aged world leaders in 1919 to form the League of Nations, at least in part, to
34. The Preamble to the U.N. Charter emphasizes that one of the major goals of the Or-
ganization is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
In addition Article 2(3) provides: "All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not en-
dangered." Id. art. 2, para. 3.
35. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
36. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL
VIOLENCE 10-11 (1982).
The precipitating factor for the creation of the League of Nations, of course, was
the carnage of World War I. Cooperation among the Allied powers during the war
produced the appropriate psychological conditions for an alliance for peace ....
Despite the collapse of the League, or perhaps because of it, there was agree-
ment among the Allied powers early in the course of World War II that some form
of international organization should be created after the war to maintain interna-
tional peace and security.
Id.
37. 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-78 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed.
1952).
38. Id. at 178 (citation omitted).
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bring about a change in this aspect of international law that allowed nations
to wage war for any reason they saw fit.39 The multilateral treaty that formed
the League of Nations required its members to attempt to resolve their dif-
ferences by arbitration before resorting to the use of force against another
member's "territorial integrity and existing political independence."'
After an initial success in dealing with the Graeco-Bulgarian crisis of
1925, and a less spectacular achievement in the Chaco dispute of 1928, the
League witnessed the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italo-Abyssinian
War of 1934-[3]5, the German march into the Rhineland in 1936, into
Austria in 1938, into Czechoslovakia in 1939, the Soviet Union's invasion
of Finland in 1939 and, finally, the German invasion of Poland in 1939.
Apart from half-hearted economic sanctions against Italy in 1935, no sanc-
tions were ever really applied by the League. To this extent the failure of
the League was due, not to the inadequacies of the Covenant, but to the
apathyL and reluctance of the member States to discharge their obliga-
tions.
This reluctance of nations to discharge their obligations would prove to be a
major obstacle for the implementation of the United Nations Charter as
well.42
To a certain extent, the United Nations Charter was the world commu-
nity's second chance to obtain a progressive development of international
law that the League of Nations had failed to achieve. Article 2(4) of the
Charter attempted to reach this goal by prohibiting "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
39. ELMER BENDINER, A TIME FOR ANGELS: THE TRAGICOMIC HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS 81-82 (1975).
We are here to see, in short, that the very foundations of this war [World War I]
are swept away. Those foundations were.., the aggression of great Powers upon
small ... the holding together of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms... the
power of small bodies of men to work their will upon mankind and use them as
pawns in a game. And nothing less than the emancipation of the world from these
things will accomplish peace.
id. (quoting President Woodrow Wilson in presenting the idea of the League of Nations
Covenant to assembled diplomats in Paris on January 25, 1919). See also The Predecessor:
The League of Nations, HIST. & FORMATION U.N., at http://www.weblearn.ca/teachersitel
UNPeacekeeping/PrintWOpicts/histformation.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
40. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 10, 12.
41. D.W. BOwETr, Q.C., LL.D., THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 18 (4th ed.
1982).
42. "The United Nations has failed to live up to its responsibilities in disarming Iraq, but
at least the process has been educational. Americans have learned anew that they can never
trust their security to that dysfunctional body. So now is an appropriate time to rethink the
U.S. role." Au Revoir, Security Council, supra note 15.
The list of [the U.N.'s] failures includes most of the great human tragedies of our
times--Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. Today the U.N.
is also failing to address North Korea's brazen rejection of its nuclear commit-
ments. In a post-September 11 world of terror and nuclear weapons, the U.N.'s
dereliction is dangerous.
Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
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any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 4 3 In
order to determine which uses of force are "inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations,"' one must first determine what uses of force are con-
sistent with the Charter. The Charter provides for at least two instances in
which the uses of force (or its threat) are allowed.45 One can find these per-
missive exceptions in Article 51' and Article 4217 of Chapter VII (Articles
39-51) of the Charter. Article 51 permits the use of force when a nation is
exercising the right of self-defense: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security."" Note that, even in the exception, the U.N. Charter seeks to
strictly limit the use of force. First, Article 51 requires an "armed attack" as
a prerequisite to invoking the right of self-defense.4 9 Second, it allows such a
defensive use of force only until the Security Council itself has had time to
take measures to reinstate peace and security.5 ° The U.N. Charter's other ex-
ception to the proscription on the use of force is commonly referred to as an
"enforcement action" of the Security Council;5' it is found in Article 42 of
Chapter VII of the Charter.5 2 Chapter VII is a natural outgrowth of Article
24, which gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintain-
ing international peace and security.5 3 Chapter VII outlines the various re-
sponses or enforcement actions, including the use of force in Article 42,
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
44. Id.
45. Id. arts. 39-43, 51.
46. Id. art. 51.
47. Id. art. 42.
48. Id. art. 51. Members exercising the right of self-defense under this article must im-
mediately report such actions to the Security Council. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. art. 45 ("In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military meas-
ures Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined
international enforcement action."); ROBERT W. GREGG, ABOUT FACE?: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 105 (1993) ("The United Nations had mounted only one military
enforcement action under Article 42 of the Charter in its entire history, and that, of course,
had occurred during the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council at
the beginning of the Korean War."); HiLaiER, supra note 21, at 268 ("Articles 41 and 42 of
the Charter provide for enforcement measures, including the use of force.").
52. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Non-forcible measures taken by the U.N. Security Council
under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter may also be referred to as an "enforcement action." See
id. art. 41 ("The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions."); HnLIER, supra note 21, at 268 ("en-
forcement measures, including the use of force") (emphasis added).
53. "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Secu-
rity Council acts on their behalf." U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
12
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which the Security Council may take in order to meet their Article 24 re-
sponsibility. 4 Article 39 first requires that the Security Council "determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion."55 It then proceeds to give the Council authority to "decide what meas-
ures shall be taken... to maintain.., international peace and security. 5 6
The use of force under Article 42 is among the measures that may be taken.
Specifically, the Article authorizes the Security Council to "take such action
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. '57 Because the Security Council never came to any
54. Id. arts. 39-42.
55. Id. art. 39.
56. Id. Interestingly, Ministers from the European Union's 15 member countries issued a
joint statement on June 16, 2003, stating: "[W]eapons of mass destruction were 'a threat to
international peace and security."' Thomas Fuller, European Union Toughening Stance on
Weapons Policy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 16, 2003, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES INT'L, June 16,
2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/0616/intemational/europe/16CND-UNION.html. The
statement echoes the language used in Article 39 and one must assume the language was de-
liberate as they also "held up the primacy of the United Nations, saying that the Security
Council should play a 'central role' in dealing with any threats from weapons of mass
destruction." Id. This statement represents a progressive development away from the
sovereign prerogative (which itself emanated from dicta found in the Permanent Court of
International Justice's Lotus case holding that "[riestrictions upon the independence of States
cannot ... be presumed," The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(Sept. 7), reprinted in 2 MANLEY 0. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 35 (Oceana Publ'ns,
Inc. 1969) (1935)), endorsed by language used in subsequent I.C.J. opinions, including the
opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), and
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), that discuss the
limits of sovereignty. In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the U.N. General
Assembly asked the I.C.J. for an advisory opinion as to whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons was permitted in any circumstance. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 1 1. The court concluded by a vote of eleven to three that there was no
"comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" to be
found in either customary or conventional international law. Id. I 105(B). In addition, by a
vote of seven to seven, the Court left open the question "whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which
the very survival of a State would be at stake." Id. I 105(E). In Military and Paramilitary
Activities, the ICJ held that there was no customary international law restraint inhibiting the
ability of a state to decide for itself the level of armaments it deemed necessary for defensive
purposes, and that "this principle is valid for all States without exception." Military and
Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 91 269.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Note that, unlike Article 51, the use of force under this section
of the U.N. Charter does not envision an "armed attack" as a prerequisite for action by the
Security Council. Therefore, Security Council authorization clearly provides for rights of an-
ticipatory self-defense or preemption, while seemingly denying these rights to individual na-
tion states under Article 51. The rationale for such a distinction flows from the purposes of
the Charter, which seek to reduce the "scourge of war," U.N. CHARTER pmbl., and centralize
the power to prevent war in the Security Council, id. arts. 24, 39. Giving individual states the
right to anticipatory self-defense would run counter to these purposes because of the possibili-
ties for abuse and the danger that such an exception would eventually swallow the rule. As we
will see, infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (particularly note 71 citing Timothy
Kearly, Raising the Caroline, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 325 (1999)), there is some question among
commentators whether Article 51's restrictions altered the traditional customary international
13
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agreement regarding a use of force against Iraq, 8 the Security Council's en-
forcement powers under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter can be
dismissed for the purposes of this paper. However, Article 5 1's exception for
reasons of self-defense in response to an "armed attack" could arguably
come into play, although such an argument would also require an analysis of
international custom and its concept of anticipatory self-defense.
B. International Custom: Anticipatory Self-Defense and Its Use
Long before the drafting of the U.N. Charter and its two exceptions to the
use of force under Articles 42 and 51, another exception, in truth the prede-
cessor of the Article 51 self-defense exception, had emerged under interna-
tional custom.5 9 This third exception to the prohibition against the use of
force has been referred to variously as "anticipatory self-defense," 6 "pre-
emptive use of force, ' '61 or "preventive use of force., 62 The first known ar-
ticulation of the doctrine came from Daniel Webster, as Professor Oscar
Schachter tells us:
The conditions of the right of anticipatory defense under customary law
were expressed generally in an eloquent formulation by the U.S. Secretary
of State Daniel Webster in a diplomatic note to the British in 1842....
[He stated] that self-defense must be confined to cases in which "the ne-
cessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. 
63
The occasion for this statement arose as a result of the 1837 British at-
tack on an American ship (the Caroline) while it was moored in U.S. wa-
law on anticipatory self-defense, which envisioned such rights for individual states in limited
circumstances.
58. Felicity Barringer, Threats and Responses: Security Council, N.Y. TwEs, Mar. 18,
2003, at A21.
Grimly, the British envoy, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, told a crush of reporters in a
basement corridor, "We have had to conclude that Council consensus will not be
possible" in line with the resolution passed unanimously in November. With that
statement, the possibility of a second resolution supporting the use of force evapo-
rated, defeated by French resistance.
Id. See also Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United
States of America: Draft Resolution, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2003/215
(2003) (Provisional Resolution never officially passed by the U.N.).
59. HiLLmR, supra note 21, at 18.
Custom in international law is a practice followed by those involved because
they feel legally obligated to behave in such a way. Custom must be distinguished
from mere usage, such as acts done out of courtesy, friendship, or convenience,
rather than out of obligation or a feeling that non-compliance would produce legal
consequences.
Id.
60. See Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 17, at 1634.
61. See Powers, supra note 17.
62. See id.
63. Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 17, at 1634-35.
14
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ters.64 The British claimed that U.S. nationals were using the ship to assist
Canadian rebels working to liberate French Canada.65 After complaint by the
U.S. for this violation of territorial sovereignty, the British government ar-
gued that the assault was necessary to prevent future attacks.66 In an ex-
change of diplomatic notes with his British counterpart, Webster acknowl-
edged a right to what would later become known as anticipatory self-
defense, but argued that such rights were limited by the necessity to take
such action as outlined above. In a separate note, Webster added an addi-
tional requirement of proportionality: "the act... must be limited by that ne-
cessity, and kept clearly within it."'67 Unlike the right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the customary right under the Caroline case
does not require an initial "armed attack" to have been committed.68 This
particular exception to the prohibition against the use of force has seldom
been recognized due most probably to the potential for its abuse. As with all
exceptions one must be careful that the exception does not swallow the
rule.69
One question debated by commentators was whether the customary in-
ternational law of anticipatory self-defense survived the progressive devel-
opment of the law on self-defense brought about by international conven-
tions, and specifically by the U.N. Charter, whose Article 51 required an
armed attack to occur before the right to self-defense could be invoked.7 °
Most of those commentators seem to agree that the U.N. Charter did not
change the customary international law of self-defense.71 It is clear, how-
ever, that the community of nations has rarely, if ever, allowed reliance on
this international custom.72 As Professor Louis Henkin explains:
64. See MOORE, supra note 18, at 409,412.
65. HYDE, supra note 18, at 239.
66. See MOWAT, supra note 18, at 109; REEVES, supra note 18, at 18.
67. Letter from Mr. Daniel Webster to Mr. H.S. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRITISH AND
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857).
68. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV.
889, 894 (2002).
69. SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 145.
[T]he general reluctance to approve uses of force under expanded conceptions
of self-defense is itself significant. Such reluctance is evidence of a widespread
perception that widening the scope of self-defense will erode the basic rule against
unilateral recourse to force. The absence of binding judicial or other third-party de-
terminations relating to the use of force adds to the apprehension that a more per-
missive rule of self-defense will open the way to further disregard of the limits on
force.
Id.
70. See, e.g., id. at 135-183; Ryan C. Hendrickson, Article 51 and the Clinton Presi-
dency: Military Strikes and the U.N. Charter, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 207 (2001); Kearly, supra
note 57, at 343-44.
71. See Kearly, supra note 57, at 327.
72. SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 144, 145-46.
[I]t is clear that most governments have been reluctant to legitimize expanded
self-defense actions that go beyond the paradigmatic case [under Article 51, which
15
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If there were clear evidence of an attack so imminent that there was no
time for political action to prevent it, the only meaningful defense for the
potential victim might indeed be the pre-emptive attack and-it may be
argued-the scheme of Article 2(4) together with Article 51 was not in-
tended to bar such attack. But this argument would claim a small and spe-
cial exception for the special case of the surprise nuclear attack; today, and
one hopes for a time longer, it is meaningful and relevant principally only
as between the Soviet Union and the United States.
73
The fall of the Berlin Wall, and the dismantling of a large part of the
former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, gave the world hope that such hor-
rendous possibilities would never occur.7 4 However, this optimistic view
gave way to the reality that certain rogue states were attempting to develop
nuclear weapons and that such weapons could eventually find their way into
the hands of terrorists. 75 The events of September 11, 2001, brought those
fears to the forefront of world politics.
II. BREAKDOWN OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND FAILURE OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL
Throughout the Cold War "it was virtually taken for granted that the
ideological division between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would make
agreement on any substantial issue virtually impossible, not just in the pow-
erful Security Council, but practically throughout the institution as a
whole. ' 76 The fall of communism may have thawed Cold War relations, but
a single "no" vote from one of the permanent members of the Security
requires an armed attack in the first instance].... Some of these arguments, if ac-
cepted, would extend the concept of self-defense so broadly as to allow almost any
unilateral use of force taken in the name of law and order. There is no evidence
that governments by and large would favor this result. On the contrary, the records
of the United Nations... show strong resistance to widening self-defense to per-
mit force except where there has been an armed attack or threat of imminent at-
tack. It does not seem likely that this resistance will disappear in the foreseeable
future.
Id.
73. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 143-44 (2d ed. 1979).
74. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 7, 12 (remembering that the
two major, defining symbols of the Cold War period were the Berlin Wall and nuclear weap-
ons, and that "the defining anxiety of the Cold War was fear of annihilation from an enemy").
75. See generally Kirk Semple, Atomic Agency Chief Urges Global Controls on Nuclear
Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at A13 (discussing Mohamed ElBaradei's address to the
U.N. on November 3, 2003, regarding the danger posed by North Korea, Iran, and possibly
Iraq because of the fact that recently, "' [ilnformation and expertise on how to produce nuclear
weapons has become much more accessible"'); Richard Sisk, Dire Nuke Threat Warning,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), May 22, 2002, at 6 (reporting on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's
May 21, 2002, presentation to the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, in which Rumsfeld
stated that "[tierrorists backed by rogue states will 'inevitably' get nuclear weapons and try to
use them against the U.S .... [and] 'that terrorist networks have relationships with terrorist
states that have weapons of mass destruction"').
76. JAMEs HOLTIE, DIVIDED IT STANDS 19 (1995).
16
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Council (U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia or China) can still bring about a
paralysis equally as effective as any experienced during the Cold War.7 7 Un-
fortunately, the diplomatic and political events leading up to the second Iraq
War illustrate this point with great clarity.
An influential group of anti-Hussein hawks in the Republican Party had
always been disappointed that the first President Bush did not pursue Sad-
dam Hussein after Operation Desert Storm.7 8 Impatience among this group
of defense policy experts only grew as twelve years passed and Hussein con-
tinued to flaunt the United Nations resolutions that sought to have him dis-
mantle his weapons of mass destruction.79 After September 1 1th, this group
of advisors saw an opportunity to finally pursue the regime change in Iraq
that never materialized after the first Gulf War. The argument they had been
espousing for more than twelve years of switching from a doctrine of pre-
Cold War containment to one of preemption had finally found a receptive
audience.8" President Bush made the argument himself in his annual State of
the Union Address to Congress on January 28, 2003:
Before September the 11 th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hus-
sein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy
terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers
with other weapons and other plans-this time armed by Saddam Hussein.
It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to
bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do every-
thing in our power to make sure that that day never comes.
81
77. The U.N. Security Council website describes the voting procedure:
Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least nine of
the 15 [Security Council] members. Decisions on substantive matters require nine
votes, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. This is the
rule of "great Power unanimity", often referred to as the "veto" power.
U.N. Security Council Members, U.N. WEBsiTE, at http://www.un.orglDocs/sc/unscmembers.
html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).
78. See Todd S. Purdum, The Brains Behind Bush's War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003;
Kirk, supra note 19.
79. See generally GEORGE W. BUSH, IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 107-103 (2001) (referred by the Speaker of the House to the
Committee on International Relations) [hereinafter BUSH, IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE]; KENNETH
KATZMAN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IRAQ: COMPLIANCE, SANCTIONS AND U.S. POLICY (Issue
Brief 2002); WHITE HOUSE, A DECADE OF DECEPTION AND DEFIANCE (2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/iraqdecade.pdf [hereinafter A DECADE OF
DECEPTION].
80. See generally Foundation for Middle East Peace, George W. Bush, Weapons of Mass
Destruction and the Middle East, at http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/srSpring2002.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (discussing President George W. Bush's willingness to adopt pre-
emption as his central strategy for dealings with the Middle East, especially Iraq).
81. State of the Union Address 2003, supra note 7. The President made a similar argu-
ment on March 17, 2003, when he gave Saddam Hussein forty-eight hours to leave Baghdad:
In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a pol-
icy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this
earth.
17
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If there was any doubt by anyone that the United States had abandoned
the Cold War policy of containment for one of preemption, that speech ir-
revocably erased such doubts. The President had begun to publicly lay the
foundation for justifying a use of force against Iraq. The President and his
advisors had to know that there would be detractors arguing that any use of
force against Iraq would violate international law, both under the U.N. Char-
ter (international convention) as well as under international custom. The only
credible argument that the President would be able to make would be an ar-
gument under the customary international law laid out in the Caroline case.
The U.S. government understood that it could not make a case for the use of
force under the guise of international conventions, specifically Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter, because Iraq had not initiated the requisite "armed attack"
against the United States. 2 However, the government argued forcefully that
an international convention argument could be justified by focusing on sev-
eral resolutions that the U.N. had passed during the period following Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990."3 In particular, the administration fo-
cused on U.N. Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441.84
Terrorists and terror[ist] states do not reveal these threats with fair notice in
formal declarations-and responding to such enemies only after they have struck
first is not self-defense, it is suicide. The security of the world requires disarming
Saddam Hussein now.
President George W. Bush, President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48
Hours, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation (Mar. 17, 2003) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesI2003/03/20030317-7.html).
82. Following the September 1 th attacks on America, the Bush administration tried hard
to demonstrate a connection between Iraq and the attacks, presumably to establish the prereq-
uisite of "armed attack" required by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See President George W.
Bush, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, Remarks by the President on Iraq (Oct. 7, 2002),
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021007-8.html; Bruce Morton,
Selling an Iraq-al Qaeda Connection, CNN.com (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.cnn.coml
2003IWORLD/meast/03/1 l/Iraq.Qaeda.link/. No clear connection was ever established, as
confirmed by the President himself on September 17, 2003, when, in response to that precise
question, he replied, "'No, we've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with
September the 11th."' Paul Waldman, Why the Media Don't Call It as They See It, WASH.
POST, Sept. 28, 2003, at B4.
White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan stressed Wednesday that Bush
administration officials never claimed any Iraq-Sept. 11 link.
Bush's remarks Wednesday followed nearly identical comments by Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld on Tuesday that the administration had no evidence
tying Hussein to Sept. 11. National security advisor Condoleezza Rice also spoke
on the issue Tuesday, saying on ABC's "Nightline," "We have never claimed that
Saddam Hussein... had either direction or control of 9/11 ."
Greg Miller, No Proof Connects Iraq to 9/11, Bush Says, L.A. TiMES, Sept. 18, 2003, at Al.
Despite the lack of evidence showing a connection between Hussein and September 11 th, an
August 2003 Washington Post survey "found that 69% of Americans believed Iraq was
'likely' behind the attacks." Id.
83. See A DECADE OF DECEPTION, supra note 79, at 4-7 (background paper for President
Bush's September 12, 2002, speech to the U.N., detailing sixteen different U.N. resolutions
with which Saddam Hussein had failed to comply since 1990); President George W. Bush,
President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002), at
18
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Of the three, Resolution 678 is the only one that expressly authorized
the use of force against Iraq.85 That resolution, passed prior to the start of the
first Gulf War, gave Iraq "one final opportunity" to withdraw from Kuwait
and permitted member states "to use all necessary means" to secure Iraq's
withdrawal if such was not forthcoming by January 15, 1991.86 The problem
with relying upon this resolution was that it only authorized the use of force
for the period of time necessary to cause Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, 7
which of course occurred with Iraq's surrender."8
The U.N. passed Resolution 687 after the end of military operations in
Iraq on April 3, 1991.89 Among other things, Resolution 687 required Iraq to
"unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless" its
weapons of mass destruction' and to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspec-
tors.9" It did not authorize the use of force. 92 Some commentators have sug-
gested that authority for the use of force found in Resolution 678 was capa-
ble of being reactivated when Iraq failed to live up to the conditions of
ceasefire that were included in Resolution 687. 9' This was the argument pre-
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2O02/09/20020912-1.html (President Bush force-
fully argued the need for action in the face of Iraq's noncompliance).
84. Minutes of the First Ministry for Peace Meeting Held in Committee Room 6, House
of Commons (July 1, 2003), http://peace.nfshost.com/ninutesl.htm.
85. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990).
86. Id. 1, 2, at 1.
87. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 85, 2; S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd
mtg. IN 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
88. Iraq surrendered and withdrew its troops from Kuwait in late February of 1991, after
thirty-nine days of air strikes and a "'one hundred hour' ground war" waged against them by
the thirty-six countries comprising the "coalition forces." Roger Normand & Chris Jochnick,
The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387,
390 (1994).
89. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
90. Id. 8.
91. Id. [ 12, 13.
92. The resolution ended with a statement by the Security Council stating that it
"[d]ecides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for
the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area." Id.
34 (emphasis added). The last phrase seemed to prohibit any enforcement action ("further
steps") without additional Security Council authority. See id.
93. TIM YOUNGS & PAUL BowERs, IRAQ AND U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1441
27 (Int'l Affairs & Def. Section, House of Commons Library, Research Paper No. 02/64,
2002).
Some commentators argued that the objective of removing Iraq from Kuwait
had been secured, and therefore the authorisation of the use of force was no longer
current, while others argued that the ceasefire [under Resolution 687] was condi-
tional and if Iraq breached those conditions then the authorisation of the use of
force had to be seen as live, including for political reasons concerning the credibil-
ity of international law.
Id. See also IAN JOHNSTONE, AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR 39 (1994) (explaining that Reso-
lution 678's authorization of force was invoked after the first Gulf War, with the support of
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sented by Secretary of State Colin Powell on behalf of the Bush administra-
tion on November 10, 2002: "The United States believes because of past ma-
terial breaches, current material breaches and new material breaches there is
more than enough authority for it to act."'94 Article 39 of the U.N. Charter
undercuts such an argument because, in the absence of authorizing force un-
der Article 42, Article 39 provides that only the Security Council retains
power to decide whether and how to enforce its resolutions.9"
Finally, the U.S. administration attempted to rely upon Resolution 1441
for the authority to attack Iraq.9 6 The Security Council passed Resolution
1441 in the wake of Iraq's failure to comply with Resolution 687's ceasefire
requirements. It required Iraq "immediately, unconditionally, and actively"
to fulfill its obligations or to "face serious consequences as a result of its
continued violations of its obligations."97 The Security Council failed to de-
fine "serious consequences" and seemingly knew what it was doing when it
chose not to use the "all necessary means" formulation of Resolution 678,
which everyone agreed would be interpreted as authorizing the use of
force. 98
Perhaps because of the inherent weaknesses in these international con-
vention arguments, the George W. Bush administration also prepared itself
to make an argument invoking international custom. 99 The President's
speeches, after September I 1th, began to be heavily laden with words and
theories that suggested Hussein was an immediate threat to national secu-
rity."° The U.S. was preparing to defend its actions as legitimately within
the U.N. Secretary-General, but only because of Iraq's violation of the no-fly zones in North-
ern Iraq). Johnstone suggests that the use of Resolution 678's authorization of force "makes
sense" for these kind of "border violations," but concludes that, "[t]he matter is less clear with
respect to the weapons-related obligations," and that "further military action [in the latter
case] would require a new Security Council decision." Id. at 39-40.
94. We Are Ready to Attack, US Warns Saddam, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 11, 2002, cited
in YOUNGS & BOWERS, supra note 93, at 28.
95. For a more detailed discussion of Resolution 687 and attempts at enforcement, see,
Ruth Wedgewood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
724, 727, 728 (1998).
96. U.S. and British officials both argued that U.N. Resolution 1441 provided a justifica-
tion for war against Iraq. Peter Ford, As Attack on Iraq Begins, Question Remains: Is It Le-
gal?, CHRISTIAN Scl. MONITOR, Mar. 21, 2003, at 5.
97. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. 9, 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1441 (2002).
98. For a discussion of problems inherent in deciphering the language of U.N. resolu-
tions, see generally Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council, 93 AM. J.
INT'LL. 124 (1999).
99. Recall that the formulation established for anticipatory self-defense by the Caroline
case requires that such defenses be confined to situations where the necessity of the self-
defense is "'instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for de-
liberation."' HYDE, supra note 18, at 239 (quoting Letter from Mr. Daniel Webster, supra
note 67); MOORE, supra note 18, at 412 (quoting Letter from Mr. Daniel Webster, supra note
67).
100. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing President Bush's comments that the
U.S. would act unilaterally if necessary).
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the bounds allowed by international law.'' Unfortunately, no other members
of the Security Council, other than Great Britain, were willing to accept this
argument. 112 The U.S. could not convince the other members of the Security
Council that Hussein presented an immediate danger for which no other re-
sponse but the use of force was available.0 3
Part of the difficulty in convincing other members of the Security Coun-
cil can be attributed to the failure of diplomacy. Unlike his father, President
George H.W. Bush, who had extensive foreign policy experience, President
George W. Bush was given to making bold decisions on the international
front without consulting our allies. 0 4 In addition, two of his most trusted ad-
visors, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld, were old warriors of previous administrations who were reaching the
end of their careers and, as a result, felt freer to suggest extreme positions
and make politically insensitive comments that would only serve to alienate
our allies."0 5 The lack of diplomacy made it more difficult to convince our
allies that they should adopt our way of thinking.
France, in particular, felt slighted by the unilateralism that the United
States was beginning to exercise. 106 President Jacques Chirac considered
himself the elder statesman of global diplomacy and politics, and he did not
appreciate the lack of consultation by the Bush administration. 10 7 Russia and
China had their own difficulties with the new unilateralism that the U.S.
government was exercising, and both wanted to restrain the actions of the
101. See generally DAVID M. ACKERMAN, LEGISLATIVE ATTORNEY, AMERICAN LAW
DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE PREEMPTIVE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ (CRS Report for Congress 2003) (examin-
ing the legality of the preemptive use of force under standards of international law in a suc-
cinct way so that members of Congress would have something to which they could refer when
President George W. Bush spoke to them about the necessity of war in Iraq).
102. See Europe and the War in Iraq, Eur. Parl. Ass., 46th Sess., Doc. No. 9768 (2003).
103. Iraq, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE: WMD41 1, Apr. 15, 2003, at http://www.nti.
org/fwmd4l 1/f2e2.html [hereinafter Iraq, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE].
104. See generally Thomas et al., supra note 5 (referring to the "Bush administration's
failure of diplomacy" in "[t]he mishandling of the U.N. vote," among other things); Fareed
Zakaria, The Arrogant Empire, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 2003, at 18 (contrasting George W.
Bush, who sent "the signal.., to our closest allies.., that America didn't need them," with
his father, George H.W. Bush, who "was envoy to China [and] ambassador to the United Na-
tions").
105. Thomas et al., supra note 5.
The threat to America posed by terrorism signaled to both men-now at the end of
their careers, with nothing to lose-that this was the time to reassert American will
in the world. According to aides to both men, Cheney and Rumsfeld talked often
in the days and months after 9-11 about the need to be bold.
Id. See also Zakaria, supra note 104 (discussing extreme statements by both Cheney and
Rumsfeld).
106. See Maggie Farley & Doyle McManus, To Some, Real Threat is U.S., L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2002. at Al.
107. See generally Delaney, supra note 9 (noting that France, led by Chirac, played an
influential role in the U.N. and that Chirac seriously disapproved of the U.S. decision to at-
tack Iraq without the U.N.'s support).
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world's only remaining superpower."' 8 It did not help that the Bush admini-
stration had made it known that regime change in Iraq had now become a
new foreign policy goal of the United States.0 9 When the time came to give
Hussein one last chance to comply with U.N. demands for weapons inspec-
tions, the members of the Security Council failed to cooperate. 110 Members
of the Security Council refused to believe that the United States was serious
about enforcement. They felt the United States was using the Security Coun-
cil as a vehicle to provide cover for itself under international law as it pre-
pared for a unilateral war against Iraq."' This was a critical miscalculation
on the part of Security Council members who opposed the United States'
unilateralism. In a way, these Security Council members abandoned their ob-
ligations under Articles 24 and 39 of the U.N. Charter to maintain interna-
tional peace and security, and this played right into the hands of the United
States' view of the need for immediate action." 2
The United States had invested much time in demonstrating that Hus-
sein was not a rational actor that could be contained like Cold War adversar-
ies of the past." 3 Unlike the Soviet Union of years gone by, the United
States argued that nuclear and chemical weapons in the hands of an unpre-
dictable and perhaps unstable individual like Hussein met the international
108. See generally War Draws Ire, Support from Unlikely Places, supra note 8 ("China,
too, surprised analysts with its harsh criticism of the U.S., indicating it would try to rally other
nations to stop the war."); Zakaria, supra note 104 (reporting that Russia has used "what in-
fluence [it has] to disrupt American policy.. . over Iraq").
109. "We will continue to counter the threats posed by Iraq, but, over the long term, the
most effective and lasting way to end this threat is through a change of government in Bagh-
dad." BUSH, IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE, supra note 79, at 3.
110. See Iraq, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, supra note 103.
111. Criticism against the United States for unilateralism on the world stage is not lim-
ited to Republican Party administrations. The Clinton administration received similar criti-
cism for acting unilaterally against Iraq: "The international outrage prompted by the U.S. uni-
lateral military intervention resulted in large part from the perception of U.S. arrogance and
unfettered use of force in handling the situation as opposed to legitimate opposition to the
substantive need for action." Gavin A. Symes, Note, Force Without Law: Seeking a Legal
Justification for the September 1996 U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L.
581, 619 (1998). Perhaps the critical distinction that can be drawn between the Clinton unilat-
eralism and the Bush unilateralism was that President George W. Bush had made regime
change the goal of his foreign policy. See supra note 109 (citing BUSH, IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE,
supra note 79, at 3).
112. France would argue that the United States had already made a decision to invade
Iraq and that any input from the Security Council would have made no difference. NewsHour
with Jim Lehrer: France Weighs in on Iraq, (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 7, 2003), at http:
//www.pbs.orglnewshourlbb/iddleeastjan-juneO3/levitte2-07.html. This may have been true
but it was no reason for the Security Council to abandon its responsibilities under the U.N.
Charter and put the United States to the test. Refusal to act in such circumstances can only
lead the U.N. down the same road of failure that proved to be the undoing of the League of
Nations. "[Tlhe failure of the League was due, not to the inadequacies of the Covenant, but to
the apathy and reluctance of the member States to discharge their obligations." BowErr, su-
pra note 41, at 18.
113. See discussion supra pp. 18-22 and accompanying notes (regarding the Bush ad-
ministration's arguments for justification of the Iraq war).
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law test for use of force as laid out by the Caroline case." 4 The United
States argued that it could not wait until the actual use of these weapons be-
fore acting.15 The Bush administration consistently expressed the additional
concern that Hussein might provide such weapons to terrorist groups with
designs on the United States. 16 Even though Hussein was not complying
with U.N. resolutions, the Security Council refused to hold his "feet to the
fire."'"I7 Under this scenario, the United States felt it had no other choice than
to exercise the use of force without Security Council approval.
The United States was probably correct in making a distinction between
the moral characters of each of the individuals and entities possessing weap-
ons of mass destruction. Hussein's prior history of unpredictability and will-
ingness to use chemical weapons on his own people" 8 made the present
situation unlike any the United States had ever faced, including the Soviet
Union's threat during the Cold War years. Given this history and the lethal
nature of the weapons Hussein was believed to have been developing, and
the weapons' potential to wreak great devastation and suffering upon large
numbers of people with little or no warning, the United States' action proba-
bly did meet the legal formulation for anticipatory self-defense set out by the
Caroline case." 19
Unfortunately, in mid-2003, news sources revealed that much of the in-
telligence used to support the argument that Hussein was pursuing develop-
ment of weapons of mass destruction was weak at best and totally fabricated
at worst.1 20 It also did not help that the U.S. military, after victory in Iraq and
114. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 17; supra text accompanying
notes 63 and 67.
115. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 17.
116. Robert Kagan, On to Phase II, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2001, at A13.
117. See Thomas L. Friedman, Vote France offthe Island, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at
15. Friedman argues that France should be kicked out of the U.N. and replaced by India be-
cause France spends too much time criticizing the U.S.'s unilateralism, and thus, France ends
up hindering any possibility for the U.N. to hold "Saddam Hussein's feet to the fire." Id.
118. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 17.
119. "[Slelf-defense must be confined to cases in which 'the necessity of that self-
defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delib-
eration."' MOORE, supra note 18, at 412 (quoting Letter from Mr. Daniel Webster, supra note
67).
120. In a July 6, 2003, New York Times op-ed piece, former diplomat Joseph Wilson
criticized the Bush administration for misusing intelligence information in order to justify a
preemptive strike against Iraq. Joseph C. Wilson IV, What I Didn't Find in Africa, N.Y.
TtiEs, July 6, 2003, at 9. See also Michael Duffy, Leaking with a Vengeance, TIME, Oct. 13,
2003, at 28. Prior to that, in March of 2003, Mohamed ElBaradei, the chief of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, told the U.N. Security Council that documents supporting an
accusation made by President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union Address that Sad-
dam Hussein had attempted to purchase African uranium for nuclear weapons research were
clear forgeries. Mitch Frank, Anatomy of a Leak, TIME, Oct. 13, 2003, at 32.
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with total control of its territory, could not find any evidence of weapons of
mass destruction.
1 21
This state of affairs demonstrates the danger of expanding the limits of
the Caroline doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. False or inaccurate intelli-
gence could easily lead to a justification for a use of force that might not
otherwise exist. It is precisely this kind of miscalculation and potential for
abuse that has led international actors and commentators to seek severe lim-
its on the use of the customary law of anticipatory self-defense as provided
for in the Caroline case.'22 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
has most recently joined in this chorus by arguing that the preemptive use of
force, like that used by the United States against Iraq, has opened the door to
establishing a dangerous precedent that will result "in a proliferation of the
unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without justification.'" 23 Never-
theless, his September 23, 2003, address to the General Assembly seemed to
concede that terrorist groups or rogue states "armed with weapons of mass
destruction" did pose a new kind of threat to international peace. t24 Annan
implied, however, that this is a threat that must be met by the Security Coun-
cil under the Chapter VII enforcement powers of the U.N. Charter and not by
unilateral acts of individual states. 125 Annan challenged Security Council
members to create new procedures that would provide "for an early authori-
zation of coercive measures to address [these new] threats" and thereby neu-
tralize arguments like those made by the United States for the unilateral use
of force. 26 Failure to act, he warned, would lead to a harsh judgment by his-
121. "Pentagon officials say the 1,200-strong team led by CIA weapons expert David
Kay ... has not found any stockpiles of deadly chemical, biological or nuclear weapons." Mi-
chael Elliott, So, What Went Wrong? TIE, Oct. 6, 2003, at 30, 33. The Bush administration
was quick to point out that while no weapons of mass destruction have been found, Kay did
discover materials that could have been used in the manufacture of such weapons. Dana Mil-
bank & Walter Pincus, Cheney Goes on the Offensive Over Bush's Policy on Iraq, WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 2003, at A4. The unclassified portion of David Kay's Interim Progress Report
to Congress can be found on the CIA's website. David Kay, Statement by David Kay on the
Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (Oct. 2, 2003), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicaffairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html. L. Paul Bre-
mer III, head of the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq, announced on December 14, 2003, that
Saddam Hussein had been captured the day before on an isolated farm near the village of Ad
Dwar, about nine miles southeast of Tikrit. Susan Sachs, The Capture of Hussein, N.Y.
TimEs, Dec. 15, 2003, at Al. Initial reports indicated that Hussein was not cooperating with
his American captors, id., but one might expect that future interrogations of Hussein may re-
veal the answer to the question of whether Iraq possessed the weapons of mass destruction
upon which the Bush administration relied so heavily in justifying the invasion of Iraq.
122. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. "There is a widespread feeling at the
U.N. that the policies of the United States [including its preemptive invasion of Iraq] have
made the Middle East and parts of the rest of the world substantially more dangerous, rather
than less." Bob Herbert, Hard Sell on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at A31.
123. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept.
23, 2003), at http://www.un.org/webcastlga/58/statements/sg2engO30923.htm.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
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tory, and he punctuated the importance of the work to be done by noting that
"[tihis may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United
Nations was founded.'
27
CONCLUSION
The war in Iraq serves as a reminder that even in this post-Cold War age
of unprecedented international cooperation, the United Nations, and the Se-
curity Council specifically, is capable of failure in its efforts to avoid
breaches of the peace in our global community. That does not mean that we
should abandon the hope for success that we have placed in such interna-
tional organizations. On the contrary, the international community of states
should rely upon them even more heavily, reforming them when necessary
to meet new and emerging challenges. As the world becomes a more dan-
gerous place, nation states must learn to cooperate with each other more
fully. No one state, even the sole remaining superpower, can hope to police
all areas of the world at all times.
The United States, with all its advantages in technology and power,
must still rely upon the eyes and ears of states and other international actors
for assistance. The world has moved into a new era of extreme danger-a
world that can no longer assume that weapons of mass destruction will re-
main in the hands of rational-thinking governments and rational-thinking in-
dividuals. The availability of such weapons and their possession by indi-
viduals like Saddam Hussein has forced the United States to stretch the
limits of the customary law of anticipatory self-defense to its logical ex-
treme. Unfortunately, this sets a new precedent for other nations to follow,
and puts a hair trigger on the international law doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense. 28 As a result of our actions, justification for the use of force has
now become much easier to establish and much more open to abuse or mis-
127. Id.
128. One must question whether the United States is ready to trust other nations to make
the same delicate calculations necessary for invoking anticipatory self-defense that it has
made in going to war in Iraq:
Even to America's staunchest allies, the British, a doctrine of pre-emptive mili-
tary strikes is alarming. They worry how the doctrine might work in the hands of
China or Russia as those nations deal with enemies within or on their borders.
Moscow was eager to embrace the new Bush doctrine as soon as it was articu-
lated, warning that it could send troops into neighboring Georgia to chase down
Chechen rebels. In the Middle East, Arabs worry that Israel will use pre-emption
to justify stepping up its strikes at Palestinian militants-and as a way to quiet any
criticisms from Washington. Similarly, Turkey might be inclined to use the same
justification for moving against Kurds who have long wanted their own state.
U.S. diplomats are even more worried that India could use pre-emption as a jus-
tification to launch an attack on Pakistan, raising fears that the conflict could spiral
into a nuclear shootout.
Robbins, supra note 5.
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take.'29 This new and more dangerous world places a greater burden upon
members of the international community to act more diligently in cooperat-
ing with each other, for even a small miscalculation could have devastating
consequences for millions of people. This state of world affairs should give
the United States and other nations of the world an incentive to reevaluate
the definition of "national interest."'l3 The Bush administration acted against
the will of many of the United States' fellow members on the Security
Council because of perceived threats to its existence-threats against its na-
tional interest. Opposing states saw the unilateralism of the last remaining
superpower as a threat to their sovereignty and relevance in the world. These
opposing members of the Security Council saw unilateral action by the
United States as a threat to their national interests. What seemed to get lost
in the arguments for the protection of individual national interests was the
fact that we all inhabit the same fragile planet. When it comes to preventing
rogue states or international terrorists from using weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the interests of all nations must be considered because the damage
done, whether environmental, economic, or physical, will not be limited to
the territorial borders of any single nation.' In that vein, the words of a
129. The instability of international affairs left in the wake of our having tested the limits
of the international law of anticipatory self-defense confirms a warning previously delivered
by Professor Louis Henkin:
A state might knowingly deviate from what had been established law (or estab-
lished interpretation of a treaty) in the hope of changing the law. But that state
does so at its peril. It does so at the peril that it will not succeed in changing the
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[War] makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear
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children's future. And we are all mortal.
President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at American University (June 10, 1963),
in "LET THE WORD Go FORTH": THE SPEECHES, STATEMENTS, AND WRITINGS OF JOHN F.
26
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2003], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol34/iss1/2
2003] ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE OR UNLAWFUL UNILATERALISM? 27
well-respected American revolutionary ring truer today than they did more
than 225 years ago: "[W]e must, indeed, all hang together, or most assuredly
we shall all hang separately."'
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